A

It is easy to see that if the outputs of the function are distributed unevenly, then a collision can be found even faster. The notion of 'balance' of a hash function quantifies the resistance of the function to birthday attacks and allows the vulnerability of popular hashes such as MD and SHA to be estimated.

Digital signatures can be susceptible to a birthday attack. A message m is typically signed by first computing f(m), where f is a cryptographic hash function, and then using some secret key to sign f(m). Suppose Alice wants to trick Bob into signing a fraudulent contract. Alice prepares a fair contract m and a fraudulent one m'. She then finds a number of positions where m can be changed without changing the meaning, such as inserting commas, empty lines, one versus two spaces after a sentence, replacing synonyms, etc. By combining these changes, she can create a huge number of variations on m which are all fair contracts. In a similar manner, she also creates a huge number of variations on the fraudulent contract m'. She then applies the hash function to all these variations until she finds a version of the fair contract and a version of the fraudulent contract which have the same hash value, f(m) = f(m'). She presents the fair version to Bob for signing. After Bob has signed, Alice takes the signature and attaches it to the fraudulent contract. This signature then "proves" that Bob signed the fraudulent contract. This differs slightly from the original birthday problem, as Alice gains nothing by finding two fair or two fraudulent contracts with the same hash. Alice's optimum strategy is to generate "pairs" of one fair and one fraudulent contract. Then Alice compares each freshly-generated pair to all other pairs; that is, she compares the new fair hash to all previous fraudulent hashes, and the new fraudulent contract to all previous fair hashes (but doesn't bother comparing fair hashes to fair or fraudulent to fraudulent). The birthday problem equations apply where "n" is the number of pairs. (The number of hashes Alice actually generates is 2n.)

To avoid this attack, the output length of the hash function used for a signature scheme can be chosen large enough so that the birthday attack becomes computationally infeasible, i.e. about twice as many bits as are needed to prevent an ordinary brute force attack.

Pollard's rho algorithm for logarithms is an example for an algorithm using a birthday attack for the computation of discrete logarithms.

**birthday attack**is a type of cryptographic attack, so named because it exploits the mathematics behind the birthday paradox. Given a function*f*, the goal of the attack is to find two inputs*x*_{1},*x*_{2}such that*f*(*x*_{1}) =*f*(*x*_{2}). Such a pair*x*_{1},*x*_{2}is called a collision. The method used to find a collision is to simply evaluate the function*f*for different input values that may be chosen randomly or pseudorandomly until the same result is found more than once. Because of the birthday paradox this method can be rather efficient. Specifically, if a function*f*(*x*) yields any of*H*different outputs with equal probability and*H*is sufficiently large, then we expect to obtain a pair of different arguments*x*_{1}and*x*_{2}with*f*(*x*_{1}) =*f*(*x*_{2}) after evaluating the function for about different arguments on average.It is easy to see that if the outputs of the function are distributed unevenly, then a collision can be found even faster. The notion of 'balance' of a hash function quantifies the resistance of the function to birthday attacks and allows the vulnerability of popular hashes such as MD and SHA to be estimated.

Digital signatures can be susceptible to a birthday attack. A message m is typically signed by first computing f(m), where f is a cryptographic hash function, and then using some secret key to sign f(m). Suppose Alice wants to trick Bob into signing a fraudulent contract. Alice prepares a fair contract m and a fraudulent one m'. She then finds a number of positions where m can be changed without changing the meaning, such as inserting commas, empty lines, one versus two spaces after a sentence, replacing synonyms, etc. By combining these changes, she can create a huge number of variations on m which are all fair contracts. In a similar manner, she also creates a huge number of variations on the fraudulent contract m'. She then applies the hash function to all these variations until she finds a version of the fair contract and a version of the fraudulent contract which have the same hash value, f(m) = f(m'). She presents the fair version to Bob for signing. After Bob has signed, Alice takes the signature and attaches it to the fraudulent contract. This signature then "proves" that Bob signed the fraudulent contract. This differs slightly from the original birthday problem, as Alice gains nothing by finding two fair or two fraudulent contracts with the same hash. Alice's optimum strategy is to generate "pairs" of one fair and one fraudulent contract. Then Alice compares each freshly-generated pair to all other pairs; that is, she compares the new fair hash to all previous fraudulent hashes, and the new fraudulent contract to all previous fair hashes (but doesn't bother comparing fair hashes to fair or fraudulent to fraudulent). The birthday problem equations apply where "n" is the number of pairs. (The number of hashes Alice actually generates is 2n.)

To avoid this attack, the output length of the hash function used for a signature scheme can be chosen large enough so that the birthday attack becomes computationally infeasible, i.e. about twice as many bits as are needed to prevent an ordinary brute force attack.

Pollard's rho algorithm for logarithms is an example for an algorithm using a birthday attack for the computation of discrete logarithms.

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